Carmen Reinhart in Kennnethu Rogoffu (R-R) je kljub vsej škandaloznosti njune napake in kritike na njun račun vseeno treba priznati, da sta v svojem drugem odzivu na kritike v NY Timesu precej iskrena.

Med drugim pravita, da sta delila podatke s stotinami raziskovalcev, da nista aktivno sodelovala pri uvajanju varčevalne politike in da sta v svojih člankih in razpravah uporabljala zgolj rezultate mediane in ne aritmetične sredine, kar naj bi bilo precej podobno rezultatu, do katerega so prišli študentje, ki so odkrili napako. Med drugim pravita:

»They neglected to report that we included both median and average estimates for growth, at various levels of debt in relation to economic output, going back to 1800. Our paper gave significant weight to the median estimates, precisely because they reduce the problem posed by data outliers, a constant source of concern when doing archival research that reaches far back into economic history spanning several periods of war and economic crises ... When you look at our median estimates, they are actually quite similar to those of the University of Massachusetts researchers.”

Zanimivo, R-R trdita tudi, da so eden poglavitnih problemov spremenljive in rastoče obresti na dolg:

»We also note in that article that roughly half of all debt overhang episodes are associated with elevated real interest rates, suggesting the kind of vicious feedback loop between debt and growth that the periphery countries of the euro zone are currently suffering ... the root of the problem is still probably the fact that as debt rises, so too does the risk that a turn in interest rates might suddenly take the country from a seemingly safe debt situation to an unsustainable one.”

S tem se strinja tudi Scott Fulwiller, sicer predstavnik sodobne monetarne teorije: »If you look at the history and even the theory of why governments get into trouble is not because of the debt, it's the debt service. Greece wouldn't be having a problem, if their debt service wasn't so high.« (42:06 – 43:30)

Seveda govori o monetarno ne-suverenih državah, ki imajo dolg v tuji valuti, kajti v monetarno suvereni državi centralna banka določa ključno obrestno mero, ki je ena njenih poglavitnih orodij monetarne politike. Ciljno obrestno mero pa dosega z nakupom in prodajo državnih obveznic (kar je glavni namen operacij odprtega trga in NE zadolževanje države). Fulwiller v svoji študiji Interest rates and fiscal sustainability piše:

»... Treasury security sales are interest-rate maintenance operations rather than financing operations; the federal government faces no operational or financial constraints; and the Fed necessarily sets an interest rate target ...

»... because banks needreserve balances to settle large numbers of payments each day and to meet reserve requirements, the Fed’s target rate influences other short-term rates through arbitrage, not vice versa. In other words, because banks need reserve balances, the interbank rate targeted by the Fed “matters” in the determination of other short-term rates even though the Fed makes no attempt to directly affect these other rates (Fullwiler, 2006).

This is confirmed empirically in numerous studies, such as those by Bartolini et al. (2005), Cyree et al. (2003), Demiralp et al. (2004), Griffiths and Winters (1997), and Lee (2003) ...” (str. 22, 23)

Pa vendar bi rezultati R-R lahko držali – za zasebni dolg -, za katerega vedno večje število ekonomistov ugotavlja, da predstavlja resen problem. Cecchetti, Mohanty in Zampolli (2011) z Banke za Mednarodne poravnave ugotavljajo, da se dolg za podjetja in gospodinjstva spremeni v problematičnega, ko doseže okoli 90 % BDP:

“Debt is a two-edged sword. Used wisely and in moderation, it clearly improves welfare. But, when it is used imprudently and in excess, the result can be a disaster. For individual households and firms, overborrowing leads to bankruptcy and financial ruin ... For corporate debt, the threshold is closer to 90%. And for household debt, we report a threshold of around 85% of GDP, although the impact is very imprecisely estimated.” (str. 1)

(seveda bi bilo potrebno te trditve o procentualni meji dodatno proučiti, pomembne pa so seveda prav tako spremenljive obresti; kljub temu pa ostaja dejstvo, da tako kot monetarno ne-suverene države, gospodinjstva in podjetja denarja ne morejo ustvarjati sami).

Slika 1: Zasebni dolg (gospodinjstev in podjetij) kot odstotek BDP za ZDA in Avstralijo med letoma 1920 in 2010 (vir: Keen) Natančne podatke za druge države, tudi po sektorjih, najdete v poročilu Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences (McKinsey Global Institute)

Zelo zanimiv je tako del odziva, kjer R-R pravita, da je bil odpis dolga vedno del njunih predlogov za reševanje krize:

“In our view, the only way to break this feedback loop is to have dramatic write-downs of debt. ... Significant debt restructurings and write-downs have always been at the core of our proposal for the periphery European Union countries, where it seems to us unlikely that a mix of structural reform and austerity will work.”

V te ukrepe bi seveda spadal tudi odpis določenega dela zasebnega dolga, kar je tudi precej znan predlog Steva Keena, pa tudi drugih ekonomistov.

R-R pravita tudi, da je dobro, da je razprava zanetila veliko zanimanje za temo dolga ter zaključujeta: “Doing archival research involves making constant judgments and yes, on occasion, mistakes. Learning from them is how science advances. We hope that we and others can learn from ours.”

Kjub temu se do sedaj še nista odzvala na kritike, da ni možno enačiti različnih monetarnih režimov oz. monetarno suverenih in monetarno ne-suverenih držav. Zanimivo bi bilo slišati še mnenje o tem. V vsakem primeru kaže, da se je ortodoksni pristop golega državnega varčevanja izpel in da bo potrebno poprijeti za nekonvencionalne ukrepe, med katere spada tudi odpis dolga.